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Introduction
John B. Davis

The concept of need, that is, human material need, is perhaps
one of the most paradoxical of economic concepts. On the one
hand, the idea of need seems an inescapable dimension of economic life. We can hardly begin to talk about the problems and
concerns that drive economic thinking without speaking about
those individuals, families, and communities whose needs go
unmet and who are hoped to be the principal beneficiaries of
economic growth and social policy. On the other hand, mainstream economic theory today-whose prominence and selfproclaimed scientific standing challenge the most dedicated of
humanists-denies needs can be distinguished from wants and
indeed denies that the concept of need has any legitimate standing in economics whatsoever. Need in the modern world, it
thus results, is a matter of preeminent concern that nonetheless
escapes formal recognition. Need is a real, inescapable dimension of contemporary economic life but is at the same time
seemingly unworthy of the professional attentions of those who
devote themselves to the systematic explanation of economic
life. In short, the very concept of need escapes us, though in
every day life we continually address our needs and respond
to those of others in our ordinary practical affairs .
If nature abhors a vacuum, however, so we also seem ever
driven to escape the paradoxes of the social world, if only because the social world is so much our own creation and responsibility. And though the paradox of need appears equally balanced
upon the manifest reluctance of mainstream economists to acxvii
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kno\yledge the concept of need and the continued genuine expression of need by persons in all domains of life, in fact the
direction in which this paradox will ultimately be resolved is
clear. Need will receive formal expression, because its character
must be understood in order that individuals' real needs be
clearly understood. Need, as so strikingly represented in the
1990 World Bank annual report, World Development 1990, devoted
entirely to the question of world poverty, will ultimately command systematic attention, because its central place in economic
life is i~escapably evident even in the face of its sweeping neglect
by most professional economists.
The essays collected in this volume make a contribution to
this future understanding of need . Written together to form an
integrated account of need and capturing some of the best insights of individuals who have for many years made the concept
of need a key focus of their thinking about economic life as
social economics, they lay important methodological and philosophical foundations for explaining the nature and concept of
need. This brief introduction seeks to answer a question preliminary in nature to their concerns. Why does mainstream economic thinking not only ignore the concept of need but indeed
',llso declare it unworthy of serious consideration? It seeks to
answer this question because answering it tells us something
valuable about how we must go about explaining the concept
of need. It also seeks to answer this question because the paradox
of need is in considerable degree the consequence of mainstream
economists' adherence to a set of unexamined assumptions
about economic life and the nature of economic reasoning that
themselves require exposure and critique if the concept of need
is to achieve the standing that attention to individuals' real needs
demands.
\ Why is it, then, that conventional economists feel entitled
to disregard the concept of need? In essence, the answer is that
mainstream economics takes the concept of need to be valueladen, therefore unscientific in nature, where that which is value-laden or in any way touches upon normative concerns is
subjective and unworthy of serious consideration. Pure science,
the aspiration of contemporary mainstream economics, is widely
believed to be positive and value-free, thereby objective. Accord-
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ingly, in place of the concept of need, conventional economists
substitute the concept of individual wants, or tastes and preferences. Wants, it is assumed, may be identified, analyzed, and
discussed without evaluation or judgment. They require no interpretation, are regarded as pure data, and are thought to be
factual in nature. Moreover, wants manifestly exceed our means
and as such are an important element in a science that seeks to
understand itself as the scientific study of the allocation of scarce
resources in the presence of unlimited wants.
From this perspective, the point of entry value judgments
make in the characterization of need is straightforward to the
mainstream economist. On the assumption that wants are the
raw data of individual economic life, the identification of needs
necessitates a ranking of wants that turns on comparing different
individuals' wants. To say that such-and-such a want is in fact
really a need requires saying that all individuals would have
this want in certain standard circumstances, and that the general
significance of this particular want then justifies our classifying
it as a human need. Needs, that is, are not specific to any given
individual but are generally shared by all individuals. In effect,
needs are universal wants. However, in the eyes of the mainstream economist this comparability requirement- or, as it has
been put in the utilitarian framework of mainstream economics,
the requirement that we be able to make interpersonal comparisons of utility across individuals-simply lacks objective foundation. Since Lionel Robbins's influential Essay on the Nature and
Significance of Economic Science, mainstream economists have insisted that interpersonal comparisons of utility are essentially
value-laden and therefore subjective. How, it is typically argued,
can one individual's wants be compared with another's without
making value judgments about the relative importance of different wants to individuals generally? Since individuals are different from one another, each presumably has his or her own
distinct scale or ranking of wants. Thus, from the neoclassical
perspective, to say that some single ranking of wants applies
across all individuals in order to identify a given need is to
impose some single conception of this ranking out of the many
possible such conceptions.
For conventional economists, wants and their rankings are
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unique to each and every individual. This reflects their status as
basic uninterpreted data, and as such is captured in conventional
economists' customary insistence on characterizing wants or
preferences as exogenous. Further, because each and every individual's wants, preferences, or tastes must be unique to the
individual to whom they belong, it follows that each individual
is a separate, autonomous identity with tastes known only to
him or herself. Each individual, that is, is an atomistic being
for whom the wants, preferences, or tastes of others are an
impossible object of understanding and whose socioeconomic
relations to others are necessarily secondary in significance to
their own status as solitary individuals. Self-interest, it then
follows, is necessarily the sole foundation for behavior in the
economic world, since individuals' own wants and tastes can
alone define their interest. All this, it should be emphasized,
follows from the simple assertion that the concept of need lacks
any place whatsoever in economics, since to allow the existence
of an objective basis for comparing wants across individuals in
society is tantamount to rejecting the notion that individuals
are isolated atomistic beings who make their own wants their
sole object of concern.
Unfortunately, in a world in which need is real, though in
,which economic science discourages its discussion, there are
costs to those truly in need that might largely be avoided were
the concept of need given formal recognition. In saying, as does
mainstream economics, that wants alone explain the material
transactions between people, one makes the ability to pay central
to any explanation of demand and conceals the dilemma that
those individuals in the marketplace who have the least ability
to pay have the most unmet needs. The market understood
solely in terms of wants, that is, effectively disguises one set of
economic relations between people with another, since market
exchange is said to reflect an agreement and harmony of interests
between free and equal persons, though beneath the surface
individuals in need are actually at risk and vulnerable as human
beings. Worse than the concealment of this important reality,
however, is the response of the market to the unacknowledged
vulnerability of those in need. Since those whose needs have
been fulfilled and who pursue inessential wants enjoy the luxury
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of being able to postpone their market transactions, while those
in need are compelled to transact for their needs in the market
in as short a time as possible, the former are able to exercise a
bargaining power vis-a-vis the latter that puts the latter at an
even greater disadvantage . When those trading for luxuries can
wait to purchase and those trading for necessities cannot, market
prices tend to be lower for luxuries and higher for necessities
than would be the case were need given the sort of formal
expression that would justify support for those genuinely in
need. Moreover, because those in need lack the financial and
material resources to express their needs in the marketplace,
while those in pursuit of luxuries typically possess an abundance
of such resources, the market tends to underproduce those
goods that satisfy needs and overproduce luxury goods relative
to what would likely be the case were need given formal expression and the reality of need to become widely apparent. These
perverse results-which are at odds with the ordinary morality
of our society-are the real costs of a science that rigidly defends
itself as positive and value-free.
Yet is mainstream economics itself really free of value judgments, as it continually claims itself to be? Close examination
of conventional economics' critique of the concept of need, it
turns out, reveals important unexamined assumptions at the
heart of the idea that interpersonal comparisons are value-laden
and subjective. On the line of reasoning that flows from Robbins's argument, interpersonal comparisons of utility presuppose value judgments because they impose a common ranking
or scale of wants upon the distinct rankings and scales of }\Tants
possessed by different individuals. Yet if one insists that ranking
wants across individuals presupposes value judgments, doesn't
it also (as Terence Hutchison wondered shortly after the appearance of Robbins's famous Essay) involve value judgments to say
that single individuals can rank and scale their wants across
different and distinct episodes of their lives? That is, if interpersonal comparisons of utility and well-being presuppose value
judgments, don't intrapersonal comparisons of utility and wellbeing presuppose them as well? And, if the latter are objective
by the standards of mainstream economics, might it not be the
case that interpersonal comparisons are also objective by those

--

r

xxii

/ John B. Davis

very same standards? Indeed, might it not even be possible
that the very reason intra personal comparisons are objective is
because interpersonal ones are?
Mainstream economics, not surprisingly, ignores these issues with the standard textbook declaration that economic science assumes that individuals can always identify and rank their
own preferences. Perhaps the problem here is that mainstream
economists, long wedded to the notion of the atomistic individual, cannot conceive of any other way of talking about preference
and taste. This then becomes the natural way of understanding
the matter, and any discussion of taste and preference across
individuals, which requires the exercise of judgment and introduces the values of the analyst, by contrast appears arbitrary
and subjective. As we will see, however, it is not difficult to
demonstrate that value judgments are also involved in saying
that individuals can make intra personal comparisons of utility.
The real issues, rather, appear to concern the kinds of judgments
and values we employ in making both interpersonal and intrapersonal comparisons of utility, and how these different kinds
of judgments and values are related to one another.
Social economists, of course, do not deny that individuals
identify and rank their own preferences and wants. Their argument is that in doing so we reason in much the same way and
make much the same sorts of value judgments that speaking
about a socially shared scale and ranking of preferences and
wants requires. Their reasoning, moreover, begins with an implicit sensitivity to one of the traditionally overlooked presuppositions of discussing rational economic agents as real beings,
namely, that since economic agents are thought capable of ranking their preferences and wants on any given occasion, then
they must also be thought able to do this consistently over time.
Real economic agents, that is, must be thought of as beings that
survive through time and changes of experience, while carrying
out programs of economic activity reflecting choices that are
consistent through time and changes of experience. For this to be
the case, individuals must be said to sustain personal identities
amidst change in themselves and their surroundings, and this,
social economists argue, necessarily presupposes a reliance on
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value judgments that permit us to explain what constitutes personal identity and what it means to be a person. From this
perspective, intrapersonal comparisons of utility, because they
presuppose an individual's personal identity, must themselves
involve value judgments. Moreover, because our understanding
of personal identity arguably depends in important respects
upon our understanding of individuals as social beings, it is fair
to suppose that those value judgments we make in speaking of
intra personal utility comparisons are somehow linked to value
judgments we make in speaking of interpersonal utility comparisons. Mainstream economics, however, ignores these manifest
linkages between personal identity and social identity, and in
the process fails to investigate the nature of the related value
judgments underlying each.
Social economists accordingly argue that a dynamic view
of intrapersonal comparisons of wants and preferences is bound
up with the interpersonal comparison of wants and preferences.
At the most rudimentary level this is manifest in an individual's
linguistic system, in that an individual's own language of valuation is socially learned, so that the terms in which one keeps
track of one's own preference rankings over time draw upon a
public discourse concerning the ranking of wants and preferences. In the thinking of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein,
there is no such thing as a truly "private language," since individuals must always express their own thoughts, however private, in a shared language. On this understanding, the linguistic
standards that individuals develop to rank their tastes and preferences are inevitably social standards. Peter Winch, in his influential extension of Wittgenstein's thinking to the social sciences, has argued that social standards operate in the sciences
in establishing the accepted use of concepts and language to
settle fundamental issues between scientists. Mainstream economists, we might then conclude, regard preferences as "like"
only when they belong to the same individual, because the
standards for preference analysis implicit in their discourse rule
out judging different individuals' preferences as "like." In contrast, social economists, because they recognize the inevitable
role value judgments play in science, are prepared to investigate~
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how different individuals' preferences are "like" one another in
the ·hope of making some progress toward explaining those
shar~d wants we call needs.
How, then, might we properly look upon the concept of
need in our theoretically more self-conscious investigation of
wants and preferences? As a first caution, one would not want
to, say that, because individuals share a common language and
aiscourse, there is but one system of ranking wants acro's s individuals in society, and that all individ':lals implicitly make use
of that 's ame system of evaluation and analysis, Society clearly
gives abundant evidence of competing and even incompatible
views of wants and needs, and thus our investigation of need
, will not produce the overly neat and determinate results that
often seem to be the goal of positive science. Indeed, an important message of the analysis developed in the essays collected
here is that the necessary involvement of value judgments in
any serious discussion of need requires that we address a variety
of issues and considerations that relate to the nature of persons
and their relations to one another in economic life. This inevitably makes the explanation of need complex and many-sided.
Nonetheless, the essays collected here still share a common
understanding of the nature of human material need, Need may
be defined as a condition of individual deprivation that threatens a
person's livelihood and integrity as a human being . Of course, the
specific ways in which this might be true for different individuals
vary across time and societies. But that needs are different at
different times and different places does not change the fact that
individuals find their ,!ery survival as human beings jeopardized
when their needs go unmet. Recognizing that debates about the
specific historical character of human material need are inevitable, this collection focuses on this single salient fact.
,

I

Warren J. Samuels, in "Need as a Mode of Discourse,"
opens the collection by arguing that because the economy is an
institutional complex continually in a process of change, it is
important to investigate the changing place and nature of the
concept of need in Western civilization and the forces involved
in and responsible for this changing conception. For Samuels,
the meaning, role, and specific content of the concept of need
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are worked out in the total socioeconomic process in such a way
as to make one or another particular normative argument in
society at anyone time. This constitutes what he terms the social
construction of economic and social reality and is something
that must generally defy sharp statement, being an ongoing
matter. Accordingly, Samuels emphasizes need as a mode of
discourse, in order to represent its conceptual framework in
terms of the socioeconomic reality in which need is continually
debated. Need as a mode of discourse, moreover, stands beside
and interacts with other modes of discourse (e.g., those concerning rights, self-interest, divine will, and so on) and must' thus
also be understood in relation to the competing claims each
of these modes makes upon us. Samuels's essay brings out
complexities of the concept of need in a historically dynamic
environment and in this way throws light on many of the debates
over the nature of need.
Peter L. Danner's "The Person and the Social Economy:
Needs, Values and Principles" begins by approaching need from
the most basic perspective of the human person in economic
life. Each of us has individual needs bound up with our physical,
spiritual, and emotional requirements, yet each of us also possesses distinctively social needs that arise out of our personal,
political, and economic relations to others. How these different
dimensions of life get expressed and ordered in economic life
is essentially a matter of the values people espouse, and here
Danner investigates the three social values that dominate contemporary social thinking: liberty (or freedom), equality (or sharing), and fraternity (or community). These three fundamental
social values themselves underlie and coordinate three main
principles of organization in economic life, respectively, competitive self-interest, government involvement and intervention,
and cooperative collaboration. Danner's portrayal well brings
out the conflicts and harmonies in society's value structure,
together with their impact on the dilemmas for decision making
faced by both individuals and groups.
Edward J. O'Boyle, in "Human Physical Need: A Concept
That Is Both Absolute and Relative," differentiates need and
wants by approaching need from the perspective of a duality
in human nature as both individual and social. In this line of
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reasoning, the Homo economicus of conventional economics is
replaced by a Homo socioeconomicus of social economics, and the
economist's investigation of instrumental rationality is replaced
by an investigation of a rationality of ends. For O'Boyle, unmet
material need undermines the very foundations of human dignity, and social economics and the social economy center principally on questions regarding the fulfillment of our material
.', needs. He insists that there is no social economics or social
economy without the principle of subsidiarity. The greater part
of his discussion is devoted to careful technical definition and
explanation of the problems associated with defining and measuring unmet physical needs. Distinguishing absolute and relative standards of physical needs in current social policy approaches to need, O'Boyle points out that the absolute standard
approach implicitly defines human beings In only individual
terms, while the relative standard approach implicitly defines
human beings in only social terms. A comprehensive approach,
which he then develops in detail, combines both approaches
on the grounds that human beings are both individual and
social. This entails a classification of unmet needs in terms of
both income distribution and minimal living standards and permits an exhaustive treatment of need that is correlated with
existing empirical evidence on need.
Anthony E. Scaperlanda's "Government Participation to
Address Human Material Need" investigates whether government should address the material needs of individuals in society,
what this participation might amount to, and how much of this
participation might be required. Arguing that there is already
a consensus in our society concerning the variety and level of
unmet need in the United States and noting that the private
sector is unable to fully alleviate this unmet need, Scaperlanda
proposes a model of gov,ernment participation in the economy
in meeting minimal human material needs that is sensitive to
tpe conventions of the American politico-economic process.
Based on theoretical foundations influenced by Thorstein Veblen
and Clarence Ayres, his analysis takes into account the historical
interaction between technology and society's institutions and
serves as a guide to a pragmatic policy making that is capable
of combining the best from opposed viewpoints concerning the
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role of government in the economy. This is an especially valuable
achievement in regard to any discussion of government policy
aimed at reducing poverty, since recent studies have demonstrated a considerable diversity of reasons for poverty. Indeed,
the importance of an imaginative and flexible approach' to policy
is especially clear in connection with the intractability of "underclass" poverty, which arguably demands a variety of strategies on different levels. Scaperlanda closes with a set of six
general guidelines concerning the kind and extent of government participation in meeting human material need.
Edward J. O'Boyle's "The Need for Work as Such: SelfExpression and Belonging" extends the investigation of need in
an often unappreciated direction by noting that physical need
and the need for work are two equally fundamental dimensions
of human material need. For .O'Boyle, work is organized and
performed through two main modes or channels, individual
contribution and teamwork, that reflect the duality of human
nature as both individual and social. Work also provides persons
two main opportunities in life that also conform to the duality
of human nature~ namely, the opportunity for self-expression
through individual contribution and the opportunity for belonging through one's involvement in work teams or groups. Within
this framework, O'Boyle examines the character and significance
of the need for work, providing in the process a large number
of examples from actual work settings to illustrate the nature
of work in the contemporary workplace. Allowing that there
are special risks associated with the needs for self-expression
and belonging, O'Boyle nonetheless emphasizes that these risks
only demonstrate the great challenges the workplace presents
in providing opportunities for personal development.
Severyn T. Bruyn, in "Social Management and the SelfManaged Firm," sees a long-range trend in the organization of
corporations away from systems of command management and,
toward systems of mutual governance that enhance each worker's capacity for self-management. This transition, Bruyn argues,
has most recently manifested itself in the emergence of increasing employee participation in managing work teams and in overseeing work systems. While early on corporations found these
changes led to greater productivity and profits, social manage-
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ment in recent decades has also come to recognize the role of
employee participation in making possible greater individual
self-development. Bruyn provides an extensive and detailed account of the patterns of growth of self-managed firms and suggests that employee ownership and management are likely to
become an integral part of corporate life in future years. He
then speculates on new, more democratic forms of worker cooperatives and addresses arguments critical of cooperatives from
conventional economists. On balance, it appears that worker
self-managed firms are likely to experience fewer problems than
traditional command management firms in future years.
In the concluding "Reconstruction of Mainstream Economics and the Market Economy," John B. Davis and Edward J.
O'Boyle summarize the arguments of the previous chapters by
arguing that a rethinking of market economics entails a rethinking of human nature and that the reconstruction of the market
economy as a social economy involves devising strategies to
help workers and consumers achieve greater personal security.
In mainstream economics, the individual side of human nature
is emphasized to the exclusion of our social side. Giving this
latter dimension adequate emphasis changes our vision of the
market economy and transforms our conception of the most
basic objectives of economic science. Unmet human material
need in the workplace and household manifests itself in the
insecurity experienced by workers and consumers. Yet while
mainstream economics gives little attention to these needs, the
social forces afoot that do address them deserve study. Examples
of private-sector and government initiatives to reform the workplace are presented. Also, special emphasis is placed on new
concepts of the neighborhood in today's American cities that
are beginning to play an important role in identifying and addressing the unmet needs of the household.
An understanding of the social economics of human material need involves a fundamental reorientation in thinking about
economic life away from the accepted and customary approaches
that characterize mainstream economics. That the magnitude of
this task is only beginning to be appreciated by professional
economists is disappointing. Yet at the same time, that signifi- ")
cant progress has been made to reconstitute the foundations of
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an economic science cognizant of need gives us good reason to
be optimistic. The essays in this book review and investigate
these systematic foundations, elaborating upon their rationales
and detailing their principles of analysis. We hope they will
provide the impetus for further serious study of human material
need in all its manifestations.
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